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LINCOLN AT 200: ON LINCOLN’S
STATESMANSHIP, DRED SCOTT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
HARRY F. TEPKER*
February 12, 2009, was Abraham Lincoln’s 200th birthday. Just over one
hundred and fifty years ago, the Lincoln-Douglas Senate race captured the
attention of the republic because of celebrated “debates that defined
America.”1 Until 2015—the sesquicentennial of the Civil War’s end—we will
witness renewed attempts to remember, reconstruct, and reconsider almost all
the lessons of the nation’s greatest and most costly moral conflict. Central to
the debate is the reputation of Abraham Lincoln.
Few men suffered as much mockery in life as Lincoln. Even after
martyrdom, historian David Donald wrote it took time for his heroic reputation
to capture the imagination. However, by the middle of the twentieth century,
“everybody was for Lincoln.”2 As Donald writes,
[Strom Thurmond’s] Dixiecrats remembered that Lincoln, as a
fellow Southerner, preferred letting the race problem work itself
out. Henry Wallace’s Progressives asserted that they were heirs of
Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln. Thomas E. Dewey, according to
his running-mate, [California Governor and future Chief Justice
Earl Warren,] bore a striking resemblance to Lincoln—spiritual
rather than physical, one judges—and President Truman claimed
that if Lincoln were alive, he would be a Democrat. . . . Lincoln
has become a nonpartisan, nonsectional hero. It seems, as
Congressman Everett Dirksen solemnly assured his Republican
colleagues, that these days the first task of a politician is “to get
right with . . . Lincoln.”3
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* Calvert Chair of Law and Liberty and Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. This
essay is an expansion of several talks, including a Constitution Day speech to the Honors
College of the University of Oklahoma. The author thanks Dean Robert Con Davis of the
Honors College for the invitation and opportunity and Michael Brooks for his assistance in the
research and editing of this essay.
1. ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS: THE DEBATES THAT DEFINED AMERICA
(2008).
2. DAVID DONALD, Getting Right with Lincoln, in LINCOLN RECONSIDERED: ESSAYS ON
THE CIVIL WAR ERA 3, 17 (2d ed. 1972).
3. Id.
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Mr. Dirksen, of course, was talking politics. Less clear was Lincoln’s
importance as a shaper of the Constitution. Talk of “framers’ intent” often
focuses on 1787 and 1791, so he is not usually mentioned in the same way as
Madison or Hamilton, or even Jefferson, as a “framer” of the Constitution. Of
course, he is acknowledged as the man who “saved the Union,” and his role
in the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment and his inspirational influence
for the constitutional traditions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
are real. He still carries weight in debate, though.
As the Second World War was beginning, two feuding Supreme Court
justices squabbled over what Lincoln would do about state laws requiring
school students to recite the flag salute. In 1940, going where no judge had
gone before—or since—Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed the issue was one
of national security, and to prove it, he invoked Lincoln’s memory and his
famous reply to critics.4 Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and
he had urged federal authorities to prosecute copperhead Democrats who
seemed to incite resistance to the draft, as well as a policy of yielding to the
demands of southern quest for independence. In reply, the President invoked
a principle of national security in a famous question: “Must a government of
necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain
its own existence?”5
Three years later, after Pearl Harbor, as America joined the fight to preserve
western civilization against Germany, Italy, and Japan, Justice Robert H.
Jackson wrote an opinion holding that governments may not compel patriotism
or flag salutes.6 He offered a more prudent perspective of Lincoln: “It may
be doubted whether Mr. Lincoln would have thought that the strength of the
government to maintain itself would be impressively vindicated by our
confirming power of the State to expel a handful of children from school.”7
If everyone wanted to “get right” with Lincoln in the past, today America
suffers from “[t]he great historical amnesia.”8 Honest Abe’s birthday is no
longer a holiday. Though President Barack H. Obama consciously invoked the
memory of Mr. Lincoln, and magazines and books followed his lead in
anticipation of the birthday bicentennial, the more dominant truths of
American life were hard to justify. Fully two-thirds of American high school
graduates cannot place the Civil War in the right half century of U.S. history.9
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940).
Id.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Id. at 636.
ANDREW FERGUSON, LAND OF LINCOLN: ADVENTURES IN ABE’S AMERICA at xi (2007).
Id.
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In preparation for a speech about Lincoln’s influence on the Constitution,
and in an informal and completely inadequate assessment of popular culture,
I asked a number of my students and colleagues about their specific memories
of seeing an image, depiction, or portrayal of the “Great Emancipator.” All,
of course, thought of the penny, the $5 bill, or the iconic Lincoln memorial.
A few students could remember an episode of Star Trek from the 1960s, in
which he was Captain Kirk’s hero brought back to life for a galactic war
game.10 More remembered that in the 1980s, he was a subject of comedy in
a film celebrating historical ignorance of the young: Bill and Ted’s Excellent
Adventure.11 Many of my students remembered a commercial for sleep
medication, in which Abe plays chess with a beaver. Almost as many
remembered a South Park episode, in which Lincoln’s ghost saves a school
from arson by the “ugliest boy in school.”12 Still others remembered, oh, so
vaguely, their own elementary school recitals of the Gettysburg Address—just
like Kindergarten Cop.13 Not one recalled seeing Henry Fonda portray
“Young Mr. Lincoln” in John Ford’s 1939 film by the same name.14
When national news magazines and presidential candidate Obama invoked
Lincoln, students were quick to express reservations or criticism—of
Obama—but few seemed conscious of still worse news about American
memory. It is conventional wisdom—whether accurate or not—that the party
of Lincoln had become the party of Jefferson Davis, the President of the socalled confederacy. Senator Trent Lott, a majority leader when Republicans
controlled the upper chamber of the national legislature, expressed both his
admiration for Jefferson Davis and his confidence that “the spirit of Jefferson
Davis lives in the [1984] Republican platform.”15
And not to be outdone in contributions to national loss of memory, some socalled liberals seem embarrassed by any attempt to defend the greatness of the
“Great Emancipator” because he once said things we cannot abide in the
twenty-first century—forgetting, of course, Lincoln died in the middle of the
nineteenth century.
As one of the outnumbered traditionalists in academia,16 I lack confidence
that there is much wisdom or sense in deconstructing and reconstructing

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Star Trek: The Savage Curtain (NBC television broadcast Mar. 7, 1969).
BILL AND TED’S EXCELLENT ADVENTURE (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1989).
South Park: The List (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 14, 2007).
KINDERGARTEN COP (Universal Pictures 1990).
YOUNG MR. LINCOLN (Twentieth Century Fox 1939).
THOMAS L. KRANNAWITTER, VINDICATING LINCOLN: DEFENDING THE POLITICS OF OUR
GREATEST PRESIDENT 6 (2008).
16. See FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 85.
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history so it will be therapy for the inequalities of the past,17 and I do not share
the view of many law teachers that principle means nothing, and law is only
a mask for the powerful. Distorting the past for contemporary agendas is just
like forgetting the past, and it is a principal cause of “[t]he great historical
amnesia” of America.18
The Constitution and Constitutional Evil
In 2006, a modern version of the case against Lincoln was published by a
scholar, a law professor, and political scientist. Mark Graber’s book, Dred
Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil,19 is thought-provoking,
impressively researched, sophisticated in its review of nineteenth century
American politics, and formidably logical. I assigned it to my students in a
seminar on Mr. Lincoln’s impact on the Constitution because it is a book
worth reading and because it represents a sophisticated recent attempt to shift
responsibility from the South to Mr. Lincoln. It is also quite wrong. And
dangerously so.
Professor Graber makes four basic points. First, a constitution’s primary
objective is peace.20 Second, our Constitution sought to promote peace
between North and South by developing constitutional and political structures
that would prevent any one section from imposing a national slavery policy
against the will and consent of another section.21 Third, Lincoln’s politics
were a challenge to this antebellum constitutional order, because he proposed
to adopt antislavery policies with only a sectional majority and with the moral
claim rooted in the Declaration of Independence.22 The result was civil war.23
Finally, judges and statesmen respectful of our constitutional tradition must
tolerate “constitutional evil” in order to guarantee peace.24 Graber believes
Stephen Douglas understood the constitutional order better than Lincoln,25 and
that a vote for John Bell, the candidate of the Constitutional Union Party, the
old Whigs, was the wisest vote to avoid the “irrepressible conflict.”26
17. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 80 (1992).
18. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 85.
19. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
20. Id. at 5-6, 247-48.
21. Id. at 92.
22. Id. at 179, 181, 205.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 252-54.
25. Id. at 239-41.
26. Id. at 247-54. “Lincoln was wrong to fight the Civil War, Bell voters believe, even if
he was right about the best interpretation of the Constitution, because just causes are better
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To blame Mr. Lincoln for the war—and to place this blame because of
Lincoln’s constitutional argument against Dred Scott—is to misunderstand
Lincoln’s views, to misrepresent the Constitution, and to ignore Lincoln’s
rightful claim to be, as Allen Guelzo argued, the “redeemer president.”27 The
older historical consensus is trustworthy: it was the southern decision to rend
the Constitution that permitted and justified Lincoln’s efforts to defend the
“last best, hope of earth.”28
To begin, the central purpose of a constitution is peace, order, and stability,
as Professor Graber suggests and as Lincoln understood, but it is also liberty,
the protection of the weak, and progress toward a more perfect justice. In
Essay No. 51 of The Federalist, James Madison reminded: “Justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be
pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”29 True,
Madison proceeded to warn against allowing stronger factions to “unite and
oppress the weaker . . . .”30 The principle can be applied to regions, as does
Professor Graber, but it also governs the doctrines of justice applied to
individuals, as did Lincoln. Madison warned of factionalism like “anarchy”
in a “state of nature,” when “the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger . . . .”31 In the memorable phrases of the Gettysburg
Address, the President remembered that the nation was conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition that all men were created equal; and that the
basic question posed by civil war was whether our nation, so conceived and
so dedicated, could long endure.32 If the people are denied the right to seek
progress, the right to search and find finer principles of liberty and equality,
it must be based on a clear, unmistakable principle in the Constitution.
The purpose of a Constitution is only one point at issue; the deeper
differences relate to the means of achieving peace and justice adopted by “we
the people.” The Constitution was written, but it was ambiguous and not yet
interpreted. On basic issues, the founding of the Republic was incomplete and
the antebellum constitutional order was changing, dynamic, complex, and
uncertain. The Constitution was neither the embodiment of John C. Calhoun’s
philosophy nor Abraham Lincoln’s deepest hopes. It was a compromise. In
realized by persuasion than by force.” Id. at 253.
27. ALLEN C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT (1999).
28. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 393, 415 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 283 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 28, at 536.
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dispute are the details of the compromise. While Lincoln famously described
and defended “government of the people, by the people, for the people,”33
Professor Graber seems to defend a government of compromise, by
compromise, and for compromise.
Parties to controversies over fundamental constitutional values may
win small victories, but the more common outcomes are further
compromises and vague provisions capable of being interpreted as
supporting conflicting values.
....
These and related constitutional compromises are the means by
which persons who share civic space agree to cooperate despite
disagreeing over fundamental political principles.34
We all know the words that describe the Constitution’s structure: the
separation of powers, checks and balances, and, most pertinent, federalism.
And the Madisonian system did far more, does far more than protect slavery
in the south. Perhaps the framers were not as committed to the prophecy that
slavery would wither and die as Lincoln believed, but surely the case for the
Constitution of 1787 rested on more than worries about the conflict between
North and South. Still, in Graber’s view, the framers understood, even
desired, that the constitutional order implement a more particular
understanding about slavery. The framers thought the constitutional
arrangements of 1787 would allow, encourage, and even require legislation
about slavery to reflect a “spirit of compromise and political
accommodation.”35 The framers chose not to “bind government in advance to
a specific set of policies,” but to “design[] governing institutions they thought
would always be exquisitely sensitive to Southern concerns.”36 Whatever the
framers’ actual intentions, advocates of the Southern point of view, some
Jacksonian, some Calhounian, saw a constitutional structure that protected
their values, including slavery and white supremacy.37
All, including Lincoln, agreed that a state’s positive law—a written slave
code—was beyond the powers of Congress. If appropriate majorities were
mustered, perhaps the power to regulate commerce among the states might
prevent interstate slave traffic. But Congress did not attempt this, and when
a Mississippi ban on importing slaves into the state was challenged on grounds
it was a regulation inconsistent with congressional authority, the Court,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
GRABER, supra note 19, at 9.
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN & RUTH G. BLUMROSEN, SLAVE NATION 249 (2005).
GRABER, supra note 19, at 101.
Id. at 76.
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including a concurring Chief Justice Roger Taney, found that the ban was
rarely enforced, and there was no case to decide.38 The implication of possible
congressional power was ducked.
The real so-called “security” for slavery was in political structure: the
processes and rules of representation, the infamous “three-fifths” clause,
presidential election by the electoral college, and equal state representation in
the Senate.39 National legislation was difficult, and a constitutional
amendment was nearly impossible. However, a compromise based on a guess
about the future course of politics is different than law. On this point, Graber
turns away from the nationalism of John Marshall and the republican wisdom
of James Madison toward the brilliantly contrived, but provincial,
obstructionism of South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun. The professor argues the
Constitution was structured so Congress could adopt no national policy on
slavery without southern consent.40 But, the text does not say this.
Specifically, interpretation of text and an assessment of specific expression of
the framers’ expectations and understandings does not yield the conclusion
that Congress was obliged not to adopt any policy on slavery without southern
consent. If constitutional theory does not surely eradicate constitutional evil,
as Professor Graber suggests, it also does not yield any obvious or compelling
support for Dred Scott’s holding that the federal government was barred from
restricting the spread of slavery.41
The complications of Dred Scott defy easy summary. Scott had been a
slave taken by an army officer to Illinois and then to the Upper Louisiana
territory.42 He then came back to Missouri with his owner.43 Eventually, Scott
sued in state court for his freedom, but the Missouri Supreme Court overruled
its own precedents.44 Southern courts had agreed that an indefinite stay on free
soil resulted in emancipation. No longer did that principle of comity govern.
Scott became a slave—again—when he came back to Missouri.45
Scott turned to federal court.46 He argued he was free because he once lived
on free soil when he accompanied his owner.47 Led by Chief Justice Taney,
the court sought to end the great national turmoil. Taney sought peace, as
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) (Taney, J., concurring).
See GRABER, supra note 19, at 93-94.
See id. at 92.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 452-53.
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Professor Graber says he was prudent to do. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion
made two points. First, the slave had no standing to bring a suit.48 He was not
among “we the people”; he was not a citizen; and no slave or descendant of
slaves could ever be a citizen.49 Second, Congress lacked power to bar slave
owners from taking slaves into the west.50 The Missouri Compromise and all
federal interference with slavery’s expansion violated southern rights.51 Only
organized states could ban slavery. Slavery could—must—expand with the
nation.
The opinion is filled with errors of logic and distortions of history.52 The
Court said free blacks were not citizens, never had been citizens, and could
never be citizens. This was not true factually, as the dissents pointed out.53
The Court said Congress could not ban slavery in western territories, though
the text seemed to give Congress the full sovereign authority over territories
prior to statehood,54 and though Congresses before and after the Constitution’s
ratification did legislate to ban slavery in the west.55
John C. Calhoun was dead when Dred Scott was decided, but the opinion
seemed to borrow his notions as completely and as thoroughly as John
Marshall borrowed from Alexander Hamilton. Dred Scott injected the
philosophy and politics of Calhoun and Dixie—about slavery and white
supremacy—into constitutional law without basis in text, original
understandings, tradition, or precedent. Dred Scott was wrong on the day it
was decided, March 6, 1857. Lincoln knew this; regrettably, the professor
does not:
Dred Scott was constitutionally permissible because American
popular majorities supported racist practices, the framers in 1787
provided some degree of protection for that racist institution, many
framers had racist aspirations, and proponents of slavery had

48. Id. at 454.
49. Id. at 423.
50. Id. at 452.
51. Id.
52. The best discussion of the Dred Scott case remains the Pulitzer Prize winning history,
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS (1978).
53. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 529-64 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564-633 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
55. The first theme of Mr. Lincoln’s Cooper Institute Address is to show a consensus of
framers’ views in favor of a general congressional authority over territories, including a power
to exclude slavery. Abraham Lincoln, Cooper Institute Address (Feb. 27, 1860), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 28, at 111-30.
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established additional precedents supporting their practice during
the years between ratification and the Civil War.56
This is not legal analysis. Most of Graber’s argument centers on a
speculative, though sophisticated, assessment of population trends. The
framers thought the nation would expand; and they wanted it, but they thought
it would expand in the direction of Texas, not California and the Oregon
territory. When the population of the north and the northwest expanded
beyond expectations, the South was surrounded, geographically and
politically. The geographical, political, constitutional, and moral “center” of
the nation changed, and only judicial review could enforce older bargains.
Graber sees the politics much as the South did: “As population moved
northwestward and attitudes toward slavery hardened, a constitution designed
to promote bisectional compromise proved a better vehicle for promoting
candidates and parties with sectionally divisive platforms.”57 Changing
political realities favored Mr. Lincoln. Antislavery politicians could seek the
presidency by appealing to coalitions in the North. A national consensus was
no longer necessary. In 1860 came victory.
Graber’s analysis is subtle. He does not argue that Dred Scott was a correct
interpretation of the Constitution; only it may be correct as a prudent act of
statesmanship to enforce the original political bargain between North and
South. The decision respected southern expectations, slave owner reliance on
the existing order. It does not matter if expectations had no roots in text or
doctrine.
When public opinion on any bitterly contested issue is
geographically concentrated, an institution staffed exclusively by
persons elected by local constituencies is unlikely to be capable of
reaching a middle ground. Moderation is particularly unlikely
when the decision-making process includes numerous veto points
that enable sizable minorities to defeat centrist proposals. The
institution most likely to fashion a workable compromise is one
whose members are selected by a national political process that
favors political moderates and whose decision rules empower the
median member. The Taney Court was such an institution.58
In this view, Graber believes Dred Scott deserves the same respect usually
accorded to the work of Abraham Lincoln’s hero, Henry Clay, and Lincoln’s

56. GRABER, supra note 19, at 85-86.
57. Id. at 115.
58. Id. at 36.
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great rival, Stephen Douglas.59 Graber’s view is anachronistic: his defense of
Taney’s Court is modern. He relies on an approach quite out of step with legal
argument of the nineteenth century. He finds “law” in political, even
philosophical, expectations. He infers principle from a guess about what the
framers anticipated about the course of American politics. He does not read
text and history in the straightforward manner of Lincoln’s Cooper Institute
Address of 1860. He argues the Court was prudent to try to preserve peace,
and objective alone is enough to make Dred Scott legitimate.
Professor Graber ignores another side of constitutional tradition, one better
rooted in text and history. Chief Justice John Marshall taught the Constitution
was meant to be flexible and durable, and it was made for the crises of ages to
come. Marshall’s framework is for a politics capable of progressive action.
Instead, Graber celebrates political incapacity, inaction, passivity, a grand
deadlock: he believed the north was obliged to do nothing about slavery, not
even to restrict its expansion. It was obliged to appease the constitutional evil
of slavery—and the commercial effort to expand slavery. The Dred Scott
decision was permissible and prudent, if not mandatory. It was Lincoln’s duty
to tolerate it.60

59. The three most important congressional acts on the issue of slavery become the
Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 1850, and the most famous work of Douglas, the
Kansas Nebraska law.
60. GRABER, supra note 19, at 13.
XXWhen Dred Scott was litigated, Americans were renegotiating the original
constitutional bargain in a political environment where forces uninterested in
accommodation had the power under the rules laid down in Article V to block any
constitutional amendment from being passed. Although all parties to the slavery
controversy claimed to be defending the old constitutional order, their real debate
was over whether the original constitutional commitment to bisectionalism should
be modified or abandoned. The national party leaders who foisted responsibility
for slavery on the federal judiciary attempted to maintain bisectionalism by
vesting veto power over slavery policies in the only remaining national institution
with a Southern majority. In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court fostered sectional
moderation by replacing the Constitution’s failing political protections for slavery
with legally enforceable protections acceptable to Jacksonians in the free and
slave states. . . . Lincoln abandoned the original constitutional hope that conflicts
over slavery would not disrupt union. His claim that the persons responsible for
the Constitution intended to place slavery “in the course of ultimate extinction”
was faulty constitutional history. Taney was more faithful to the original
Constitution when he championed policies that could be supported by Jacksonians
throughout the nation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Lincoln’s Statesmanship
Lincoln understood his duty, and the truth is he agreed with some of what
Professor Graber preaches. Constitutional peace depended on tolerating
constitutional evil to the extent required, but Lincoln, like Madison, knew a
principle should not always be pressed to its ultimate conclusion. Specifically,
the Union could not interfere with slavery where it existed, in southern states
willing to protect the practice with their written law, but the Union could and
should prevent its spread. He hoped, as he believed the framers hoped, that a
contained slavery ultimately would wither and die. The Constitution did not
establish a right to move across state lines with slaves or to establish residence
in a new territory with slaves. If Lincoln’s views threatened southern
preferences, it does not follow—automatically, at least—that his views
violated the region’s constitutional “rights.”
Lincoln’s vision was
majoritarian, as Graber suggests, but it was also limited, checked, and
balanced. Lincoln’s majoritarianism was “neither an axiom of democratic
theory nor the fundamental procedural commitment underlying the
Constitution of 1787.”61 But neither was it unconstitutional.
Professor Graber’s accusation against Mr. Lincoln is, in the final analysis,
neither new, nor novel. In many ways, it traces elements of the South’s
arguments in the years preceding Fort Sumter. Dred Scott was law; it created
rights the North was bound to respect; free blacks and slaves had no rights in
the Constitution that white people were bound to respect; any attempt to alter
Dred Scott would cause secession and disunion. The constitutional
compromise—the bisectional veto—meant the opponents of slavery could not
seek to undermine it—gradually, legally, politically—though not a word in the
Constitution guarantees the permanence of slavery. It is odd: the Union exists
at the sufferance of each state’s majority, but a national majority could do
nothing to restrain economic spread and reinforcement of slave owners’
political power.
Graber’s indictment of Lincoln is haunting. Military victory was not
inevitable; neither was Lincoln’s reelection. Some believe there were
opportunities to reach a compromise even after Lincoln’s election, though
many states seceded even before his inauguration.62 Death took 620,000
young men.63 Graber blames Lincoln because he stood firm in his moral,
political, and constitutional beliefs. But he is responsible only because he
would not surrender all discretion on disputed policy questions to a concurrent
61. Id. at 187.
62. WILLIAM MARVEL, MR. LINCOLN GOES TO WAR 3 (2006).
63. Id. at xvi.
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southern majority. Graber maintains Lincoln was obliged to do nothing (or
much less) to threaten the existing constitutional order.
Lincoln won an uncertain victory, which made matters worse. Lincoln did
not, in fact, have a working majority in favor of banning slavery in the
territories. He was elected in 1860 with the smallest portion of the popular
vote for any president in American history, and his Republican Party captured
only 31 of 64 seats in the Senate and 106 of 237 in the House.64 Lincoln won
the White House with no southern votes.
In this perspective, Lincoln really is like all other abolitionists—William
Lloyd Garrison, John Brown, agitators—all traitors to the antebellum
constitutional order, and the Constitution is caricatured to be much like the
“covenant with death and an agreement made in hell” described by Garrison.65
Professor Graber’s argument, at its core, endorses the naked southern threats
of the era as a prudent constitutionalism. Missing in this damning comparison,
of course, is evidence of Mr. Lincoln’s state of mind. The problem has
interested scholars for many years, and an unstated premise is that Mr. Lincoln
was either reckless or deliberate as he endangered peace and Union. Lord
Charnwood’s classic biography offered the older, prevailing view of Mr.
Lincoln’s state of mind:
It is impossible to estimate how far Lincoln foresaw the strain to
which a firm stand against slavery would subject the Union. It is
likely enough that those worst forebodings for the Union . . . were
confined to timid men who made a practice of yielding to threats.
Lincoln appreciated better than many of his fellows the sentiment
of the South, but it is often hard for men, not in immediate contact
with a school of thought which seems to them thoroughly perverse,
to appreciate its pervasive power, and Lincoln was inclined to stake
much upon the hope that reason will prevail. Moreover, he had a
confidence in the strength of the Union . . . .66
Now, of course, is a moment for an intricate law professor’s theoretical
dissertation on why Lincoln’s critics are wrong. But nothing improves on
what Mr. Lincoln himself offered in his famous Cooper Institute Address.67
Lincoln is straightforward and elegant in his logic. He searched the law library
for the views of all thirty-nine signatories of the Constitution. A clear
64. GRABER, supra note 19, at 186-87.
65. Id. at 226-27
66. LORD CHARNWOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A BIOGRAPHY 99 (Madison Books 1996)
(1916).
67. Abraham Lincoln, Cooper Institute Address (Feb. 27, 1860), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 28, at 111.
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majority, including Washington and Madison, voted for federal statutes
banning slavery in the western territories. Their votes proved that “no proper
division of local from federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution,
forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in the federal territories.”68
But apart from an approach to history and law not much admired by many law
professors today, Lincoln offers a proper allocation of moral responsibility that
our nation dare not forget.
Speaking to an audience in New York City, he addressed a “few words to
the Southern people.”69 He understood the south would “break up the Union
rather than submit to a denial of your Constitutional rights.”70 What rights?
At issue was Dred Scott.
When you make these declarations, you have a specific and wellunderstood allusion to an assumed Constitutional right of yours, to
take slaves into the federal territories, and to hold them there as
property. But no such right is specifically written in the
Constitution. That instrument is literally silent about any such
right. We . . . deny that such a right has any existence in the
Constitution, even by implication.71
Lincoln was attempting to show the south could not claim to be either
“conservative” or “right.”
Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is, that you will destroy the
Government, unless you be allowed to construe and enforce the
Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and
us. You will rule or ruin in all events.
....
. . . [Y]ou will not abide the election of a Republican President!
In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and
then, you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon
us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and
mutters through his teeth, “Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you,
and then you will be a murderer!”72
Lincoln’s plea was for moderation.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126-27.
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Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone
where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from
its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will
prevent it, allow it to spread into the National Territories, and to
overrun us here in these Free States? If our sense of duty forbids
this, then let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively.73
It was the South that denied the right of citizens to petition for abolition, to
speak for emancipation. It was the South that demanded that all doors be
closed against the possibility that slavery might wither and die. It was the
South that took a course that even Colonel Robert E. Lee denounced as
unjustified revolution and anarchy.74 It was the South that threatened the last
best hope of Earth, not Lincoln.
Lincoln’s Growth
Over the years, Lincoln’s reputation suffered because some attacked his
caution and moderation: he was, it is said, too respectful of the constitutional
status quo. Some wanted him to be John Brown. Others wanted him to be
John Calhoun. In this view, he was too aggressive in an assault on the
constitutional status quo. Still others measure him by moral standards of the
late twentieth century.
We cannot reconstruct Lincoln into a modern man, but we ought to
remember how much he grew and how well he helped the Constitution to
73. Id. at 129-30.
74. ALAN T. NOLAN, LEE CONSIDERED: GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND CIVIL WAR HISTORY
34-35 (1991) (quoting Letter from Robert E. Lee to G.W.P. Custis (Jan. 23, 1861)).
As an American citizen, I take great pride in my country, her prosperity and
institutions, and would defend any State if her rights were invaded. But I can
anticipate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union. It
would be an accumulation of all the evils we complain of, and I am willing to
sacrifice everything but honor for its preservation. I hope, therefore, that all
constitutional means will be exhausted before there is a resort to force. Secession
is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so
much labor, wisdom and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so
many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of
the Confederacy at will. It is intended for “perpetual union,” so expressed in the
preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can
only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention
assembled. It is idle to talk of secession. Anarchy would have been established,
and not a government, by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the
other patriots of the Revolution.
Id. (emphasis added).
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grow. It is true he resisted the race-baiting of opportunistic political opponents
with language we now see as undercutting faith in the equality of man, but his
passion was always for equality of rights, not utopian equality of talent,
equality of wealth, or equality of property.75 He had the doubts of a rational
man of the nineteenth century. And the prejudice. Early in his career he said
enough to show he had not grown up free from the bias and stereotypes of his
time. But he grew.76
Necessity was the key. He came to understand that emancipation need not
be defended solely on moral grounds; it was a practical strategy to win the
war. In a public letter addressed to a political rally in Springfield, Illinois—his
home town—President Lincoln was direct in his response to critics of the
Emancipation Proclamation: “[T]o be plain, you are dissatisfied with me about
the negro.”77 Critical historians say he cared more about Union than liberty.
Perhaps. But he also articulated the moral case for citizenship:
You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem
willing to fight for you; but, no matter. Fight you, then,
exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on
purpose to aid you in saving the Union . . . .
. . . [I]n your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the
negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened
the enemy in his resistence to you . . . . [W]hatever negroes can be
got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to
do, in saving the Union.78
His aspirations were idealistic, even if his rhetoric emphasized the practical.
But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they
do any thing for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake
their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive-even the promise of freedom. And the promise being made, must
be kept.79
Lincoln’s eyes had been opened. He had been moved by the courage of black
soldiers only recently pressed into battle. The promise of freedom—of
75. GUELZO, supra note 1, at 82-85.
76. A recent, useful, and balanced summary of this debate over Lincoln’s racial views is
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, BIG ENOUGH TO BE INCONSISTENT: ABRAHAM LINCOLN CONFRONTS
SLAVERY AND RACE (2008).
77. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 28, at 495-96.
78. Id. at 498.
79. Id.
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citizenship—“must be kept.” All depended on victory. And when victory
comes, he continued:
[T]here will be some black men who can remember that, with silent
tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised
bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation;
while, I fear, there will be some white ones, unable to forget that,
with malignant heart, and deceitful speech, they have strove to
hinder it.80
Lincoln needs only a character witness. Lincoln’s advocates need only call
on Frederick Douglass, who had been an idealist, even a radical, who could
admire a moderate. Douglass had experienced the confusion and frustration
of a passionate advocate of abolition and racial equality, who was often not
quite sure of Lincoln’s priorities. Still, his conclusions are generous and
realistic.
[Lincoln’s] great mission was to accomplish two things: first, to
save his country from dismemberment and ruin; and second, to free
his country from the great crime of slavery. To do one or the other,
or both, he must have the earnest sympathy and the powerful
coöperation of his loyal fellow-countrymen. . . . Viewed from the
genuine abolition ground, Mr. Lincoln seemed tardy, cold, dull, and
indifferent; but measuring him by the sentiment of his country, a
sentiment he was bound as a statesman to consult, he was swift,
zealous, radical, and determined.81

80. Id. at 499.
81. Frederick Douglass, Oration In Memory of Abraham Lincoln (Apr. 14, 1876), in
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 915, 921 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1994).
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